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A B O U T T H E I P T S R E P O R T 
r he IPTS Report was launched in December 1995, on the request and under the auspices of Commissioner Cresson. What seemed like a daunting challenge in late 1995, now appears in retrospect 
as a crucial galvaniser of the IPTS' energies and skills. 
The Report has published articles in numerous areas, maintaining a rough balance between them, and 
exploiting interdisdpltnarit}' asfar as possible. Articles are deemed prospectively relevant if they attempt to 
explore issues not yet on the policymaker's agenda (but projected to be there sooner or later), or 
underappreciated aspects of issues already on the policymaker's agenda. The long drafting and redrafting 
process, based on a series of interactive consultations with outside experts, guarantees quality control. 
The clearest indication of the report's success is that it is being read. An initial print run of 2000 for the first 
issue (00) in December 1995 looked optimistic at the time, but issue 00 has since turned into a collector's 
item. Tbtal readership rose to around 10,000 in 1997, with readers continuing to be drawn from a variety 
of backgrounds and regions world-uHde, and in 1998 a shift in emphasis towards the electronic version on 
the Web has begun. 
The laurels the publication is reaping are rendering it attractive for authors from outside the Commission. 
We bave already published contributions by authors from such renowned institutions as the Dutch TNO, the 
German VD1, the Italian ENEA and the US Council of Strategic and International Studies. 
Moreover, the IPTS formally collaborates on the production of the IPTS Report with a group of prestigious 
European institutions, with whom the IPTS has formed the European Science and Technology Observatory 
(ESTO), an important part of the remit of the IPTS. The IPTS Report is the most lisible manifestation of this 
collaboration. 
The Report is produced simultaneously in four languages (English, French, German and Spanish) by the 
IPTS; to these one could add the Italian translation volunteered by ENEA: yet another sign of the Reports 
increasing visibility. The fact that it is not only available in several languages, but also largely prepared and 
produced on the Internet World Wide Web, makes it quite an uncommon undertaking. 
We shall continue to endeavour to find the best way of fulfilling the expectations of our quite diverse 
readership, avoiding oversimplification, as well as encyclopaedic retiews and the inaccessibility of academic 
jourtmL·. The key is to remind ourselves, as well as the readers, that we cannot be all things to all people, 
that it is important to carve out our niche and continue optimally exploring and exploiting it, hoping to 
ill tt run Mit· topics under a new, revealing light for the benefit of the readers, in order to prepare tbemfor 
managing the challenges ahead. 
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Regional Development 
Globalization. Digitization and the Changing European Context: impacts 
on regional economies r Globalization and EU expansion are changing'the competitive environment, and will 
particularly affect the less-favoured regions. As well as challenges, this will provide 
opportunities for their economic development, calling for new policy responses to 
accentuate regional advantage and specialization. 
innovation and Tecnology Policy 
11 
F 
openness in scientific Advisory Committees 
Scientific advisory committees have become a standard means of support to government 
in increasingly complex fields. Pressures to democratize deliberative policy-making are 
leading to various mechanisms to increase openness and public participation in 
scientific advisory systems. 
Skills and Training 
20 Education and Training for innovation: individual and organizational 
learning 
The survival of many small firms will depend on their capacity to innovate. So, not only 
do they need to be encouraged to recruit more technically qualified staff, but they will 
need to learn how to diffuse knowledge throughout their organizations. 
Agriculture & Nut r i t ion 
26 European Agriculture and Future World Food Demand 
Increased population and changing consumption patterns are likely to fuel strong growth 
in demand for food in the coming decades. Europe's capacity to produce in excess of its 
needs puts its agrofoóds industry in a strong position to meet this future challenge. 
Biotecnology 
33 Biotechnology R&D Policy: Bridging commercial Interests and 
a> Environmental. Distributive and Ethical Concerns 
Experience in Denmark suggests that informing the public and involving citizens in the 
debate surrounding a new technology, although a prerequisite for acceptance, may not 
achieve it unless backed by a flexible approach to the path the new technology takes. 
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E D I T O R I A L 
r D i m i t r i s K y r i a k o u , IPTS D iscount rates are the 'interest' rates at which we discount future benefits to obtain their net present value, i.e. how much one would be willing to pay today to get a 
certain benefit in the future. Participants in the 
sustainability debate have on occasions used clever 
examples of the ability of discount rates and long 
term compounding to produce absurd results as a 
way of shocking their audiences. Let us see if these 
examples make sense, and perhaps unmask in the 
process some of their problematic assumptions, or 
even fallacies. 
For instance, assuming world GDP grows at 
an average 3% over the next 200 years then world 
GDP will have a value of US$8 quadrillion 
(8,000,000,000,000,000) in 2200. Now, using a 7% 
real (net-of-inflation) long term discount rate the net 
present value of this amount is about US$10 billion 
(10,000,000,000). This means that, at these rates, 
given the choice, one should not pay more than ten 
billion US$ today in order to enjoy the world's 
output in 2200. A more sustainability-relevant 
interpretation of this is that the present generation, 
assuming it cares sufficiently about the GDP of its 
descendants (this is an issue for another editorial) 
should not spend more than ten billion US$ to 
prevent the loss of all output in 2200, an absurd 
situation for any reasonable observer. 
What is wrong with this picture? Is there a sleight-
of-hand that leads to this paradoxical result, making 
discounting look silly? Indeed there is. Discounting at 
7% implies that you can find alternative investments 
paying you an average 7% return for those 200 years, 
so that at the end of those 200 years you can have 
more than the foregone 8 quadrillion, thus 
presumably justifying your original decision to forego 
world output at 2200. But there is the rub. If there is 
no output at all at 2200, who will be able to give you 
your capital and accumulated interest? If you are paid 
back in assets (cash, bonds, etc.) what is their value if 
there are no goods to purchase with them? Since you 
forewent the entire world's GDP there are no goods in 
which to translate your paper earnings. The source of 
the fallacy is to ignore the link between utility, goods, 
and money income. All the analyses of rational 
decision-making (discounting included) are on the 
basis of utility derived from the consumption of goods 
(in the most general sense of the word). Since money 
incomes determine consumption potential, money 
incomes are used as imperfect proxies for utility. In 
our case however the link money income -> goods 
consumption -> utility is broken because we have 
allowed goods to disappear, hence even huge money 
incomes are useless - they cannot be turned into 
utility. It is therefore not discounting that is absurd, 
but the way it is used in this specific example. 
Note that this covers only one pitfall (albeit a 
basic one) relating to the use (or abuse) of long-term 
discounting. There are several others. What 
determines the magnitude of an appropriate discount 
rate? Is human impatience to gratify wants and needs 
(the technical term for it is 'pure time preference' ) a 
part of it? People do not live forever, and it is not 
clear how much they do or should care for the well-
being of their distant descendants. Is there a way to 
treat intergenerational optimization issues rationally? 
Values and preferences as well as income patterns 
can change substantially over the centuries. How 
can this be accounted for? We are already however 
treading the waters of larger issues, and perhaps the 
topics of future editorials. 
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Globalization, Digitization and the 
Changing European Context: impacts 
on regional economies 
Matthias Weber, IPTS, Luc Soete, MERIT 
issue: Globalization and the growing digitization of the economy have changed the 
operational context for economic and political entitles. Within Europe, EMU and the 
enlargement process are additional parameters of this transformation process. These 
changes will bring about new competitive conditions for Europe's regions, particularly 
affecting the less-favoured ones. 
Relevance: with globalization and digitization, new location-related choices open up for 
Internationally oriented firms, thus changing the patterns of regional comparative 
advantage In Europe and worldwide. As a result there will be new opportunities for their 
economic development, calling for new policy responses to exploit benefits from 
regional advantage and specialization. 
The global context is changing. 
ÍÍ, G lobalization" has become one of the catchwords of recent years. It has been attributed a role in both heightening economic competition 
and as a source of wealth. Today, it undoubtedly 
operates as one of the main drivers of economic 
change affecting all industrial economies. 
Globalization is tangible in measures of trade 
and foreign direct investment flows. Trade data 
show that the global economy is emerging through 
a process of regionalization into three main trading 
blocs: the EU, ASEAN and NAFTA. In Europe, for 
example, in the mid-Nineties between 60% and 
70% of trade flows took place inside the EU. About 
half of these ¡ntra-EU trade flows were based on 
"vertical" product differentiation, with trading 
partners specializing on complementary quality 
levels within the same product class, or on different 
links in the production chain. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows also seem to reflect the 
consolidation of these global-regions. Again, 
European FDI peaked in anticipation of the Single 
Market in 1993 and was largely made up of intra-
EU investments. In this case, the investments aimed 
to secure a presence in the world's largest 
consumer market. Current drivers are the prospects 
of further gains from investment, mergers and 
acquisitions resulting from the planned 
deregulation of public utilities and the greater 
transparency brought about by the single currency. 
Globalization also has an "intangible" 
dimension in the form of the internationalization 
3 
Globalization is tangible 
in measures of trade 
and foreign direct 
investment flows. Trade 
data show that the 
global economy is 
emerging through 
a process of 
regionalization into 
three main trading 
blocs: the EU, ASEAN 
and NAFTA 
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The intangible 
dimension of 
globalization is the 
internationalization of 
information and 
knowledge flows 
brought about by the 
internationalization 
of the media and 
scientific communities, 
greater personal 
mobility, increased 
international contact 
between firms, etc. 
Information and 
Communication 
Technology (ICT) 
networks not only 
permit access to 
information worldwide, 
but also provide the 
nervous system for the 
internal coordination 
and logistic control of 
widely dispersed 
production sites 
of information and knowledge flows. Several 
different intangible flows can be distinguished 
(Soete, 1999): 
• Financial flows, perhaps the most influential 
intangible; 
• Intermediate service flows within and between 
firms, enhanced by the deregulation of markets 
worldwide; 
• Formal international cooperation on joint 
ventures, strategic alliances or collaborative 
research; 
• Global knowledge flows in scientific 
communities and across the media; 
• Transfers of tacit knowledge through greater 
personal mobility and exchanges in industry, 
politics, science and culture. 
Global exchanges of both intangible and 
tangible flows are facilitated by "digitization". 
Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) networks not only permit access to 
information worldwide, but also provide the 
Box 1. intangibles and markets 
nervous system for the internal coordination and 
logistic control of widely dispersed production 
sites. Products and services are themselves also 
increasingly informational in nature and therefore 
transmissible over ICT-networks. 
Taken together, globalization and digitization 
are significantly affecting the geography of 
innovation and choice of location. This could 
mean radical changes to market allocation and 
incentives, with implications for patterns of 
growth, employment and income (Box 1). 
Intangible factors of growth, also, are particularly 
salient in some of the most economically and 
technologically dynamic industries such as ICTs, 
and the life sciences. 
...and Europe is undergoing major 
transformations 
European regions on the other hand are facing 
further significant changes in their context due to 
Markets for intangible goods and services challenge traditional assumptions about how markets 
operate. This can be illustrated through the example of software: 
• Software can be easily copied, which means that it is difficult if not impossible to make sure that 
producers get paid for their efforts (i.e. property rights are weak). 
• Where strong property protection is introduced, there is a risk of monopolistic behaviour exercised 
through proprietary standards, a situation typical of software products. 
• Exchanges of information-based goods and services are subject to strong asymmetries between 
seller and buyer. Often, this calls for trusted intermediaries as deal brokers or the offer of free trial 
versions. 
It seems that markets for intangibles are different, strong property protection can suppress the "non-
rival" nature of many intangibles (i.e. that one person's enjoyment does not diminish any one else's 
enjoyment of the good). Protecting exclusivity (to guarantee that producers are paid for their work) 
without inhibiting non-rivalry in use is a crucial issue for dynamic efficiency and incentives to 
innovate. The issue is whether these conditions constitute a market failure calling for intervention in 
the form of property protection and competition policy. 
Source: Soete (1999). 
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political developments. Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and enlargement to the east were 
political decisions, but they reinforce the process 
of economic integration in Europe. EMU will have 
a number of beneficial consequences. It will 
expand the effective market size within the Euro 
zone, through the greater transparency of prices, 
the disappearance of exchange-rate risk and the 
imposition of stability-oriented economic policy, 
which tends to reduce capital costs. Also, with 
trends towards liberalization and competition in 
the financial sector, sources of investment capital 
should become more flexible and cheaper (see 
Tsipouri 1999). 
These advantages accrue to firms right across 
the EU from rich to poor, pointing towards 
greater inter-regional competition. But, firms 
located in the more advanced areas are likely to 
be better rewarded by EMU than firms in less 
favoured regions. Many firms in less favoured 
regions, especially the large numbers of smaller 
ones, lag behind in terms productivity, 
technology and organizational techniques. Such 
firms might find themselves under increasing 
pressure from the greater accessibility of their 
markets to competitors from elsewhere in Europe. 
Meanwhile, the economic convergence 
process in Europe is likely to raise labour costs in 
the medium to longer term. This is likely to reduce 
the scope for lagging regions to compete with non-
European competitors on the basis of labour costs. 
Moreover, EMU means that monetary policies (e.g. 
currency devaluation) can no longer be used to 
improve the competitiveness of domestically 
produced goods. Overall, the EMU will put less 
favoured regions under a dual pressure, from both 
in- and outside of the Euro zone. 
The enlargement process further complicates 
the situation for the less favoured regions. One of 
the most important consequences is a widening of 
the wealth gap in the EU (see Figure 1 ). In essence 
this means that regions that are today regarded as 
"less favoured" will define the new average 
wealth level, with the consequence that they no 
longer qualify for structural support. There is some 
time to adjust to these new conditions, but time is 
quite short. 
Figure 1. impact of successive EU-enlargements 
EU6-EU9 
EU9-EU12 
EU12-EU15 
EU15-EU26 
Increase in 
surface 
Increase in 
population 
Increase in 
total GDP 
Change of 
GDP/capita 
Source: Eurostat 1998, IPTS 1999. 
% 
The larger effective 
market ushered in by 
the euro will benefit 
firms of all sizes across 
Europe, although firms 
located in more 
advanced areas are 
likely to be better 
rewarded by EMU 
than firms in less 
favoured regions 
5 
The less favoured 
regions face the 
additional difficulty that 
the widening wealth 
differences in an 
expanded EU will 
mean they are no 
longer eligible for 
structural support 
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Although ICTs reduce 
geographical barriers, 
factors such as access 
to skilled labour, good 
infrastructure and 
institutions will mean 
some regions still 
have an advantage 
over others 
in addition, the 
attractiveness of 
regions to investors 
is influenced by 
factors such as local 
purchasing power (GDP 
per capita), the quality 
of local infrastructures, 
working conditions, 
a dynamic and 
entrepreneurial 
climate, and access 
to specialized centres 
of excellence 
Regional impact: issues and 
opportunities 
ICTs can imply the "death of distance", i.e. 
bringing down the geographical barriers to 
economic development and hence allowing 
peripheral regions to overcome some of the 
physical barriers they have faced. But there will be 
countervailing concentration effects, with some 
regions better able to exploit location-related 
advantages than others. Thus, it is true that, with 
digitisation and dematerialisation, proximity and 
physical factor endowments become less crucial 
economic constraints. But, there are still 
substantial barriers to decentralization of the 
economy, especially through economies of 
agglomeration in intangibles. These include 
access to large pools of highly skilled labour, 
good infrastructures and institutions and the 
impossibility of downloading crucial tacit 
know-how. In fact, specific location-related 
characteristics and comparative advantages 
are likely to become accentuated rather 
than diminished. This can be illustrated through 
four examples: 
Regions in the digitized economy: First, the 
sine qua non of the digital economy is the 
information infrastructure of physical networks 
and nodes. Firms in less favoured regions in 
Europe still lag behind in terms of access to 
advanced ICT-infrastructures and value added 
services tend to be more costly. Second, to 
exploit the new technologies, people must be 
willing and able to use them. There is a need for 
computer and communications specialists and a 
general ICT-literacy. A knowledge base of higher 
education and research institutes and 
professional training capacity which matches the 
industrial specialization profile of the regions is 
also needed. Many less favoured regions do not 
yet meet these conditions. In addition, the 
attractiveness of regions to investors is 
influenced by factors such as local purchasing 
power (GDP per capita), the quality of local 
infrastructures, working conditions, a dynamic 
and entrepreneurial climate, and access to 
specialized centres of excellence. The quality of 
life (e.g. climate, leisure amenities, etc.) and 
social stability are also important to skilled 
workers. Finally, regions and their firms have to 
learn to deal with the intellectual property issues 
and information asymmetry problems of 
intangible markets. 
Customization of products and services: The 
trend towards the customization of products and 
services tailored to local demands, even down to 
the individual, offers scope for decentralized 
growth. On the one hand, final assembly of 
products and packaging of services according to 
local habits and traditions is becoming more 
widespread in all areas from food (e.g. "produits 
du terroin) to fast growing client-based business 
services. With quality, timeliness and flexibility 
becoming key dimensions of competitiveness, 
multinationals are often seeking a local presence 
so as to understand local preferences and 
operating constraints and to track localized 
changes in demand. Complex or uncertain 
transactions or those depending on the tacit 
quality dimension, place a premium on the 
spatial proximity of the producer and consumer. 
Thus, even in the digital economy, local human, 
social and institutional conditions matter. For 
regions this means that the more sophisticated 
and differentiated the local demand the less 
likely it is that disembodied electronic 
commerce will substitute for physical presence 
and the investment and jobs such a presence 
might bring. 
Specialization and complementarity: In the 
longer-term European and global competition will 
probably lead to greater regional specialization. 
Except in niche markets, regions are unlikely to be 
able to maintain world class, price competitive 
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industry and services on their own. Few regions 
wil l have the strength to maintain a 
comprehensive industrial portfolio. The main 
difficulty, of course, is to identify in which areas a 
specific region should specialize. Examples of 
successful strategies are legion: the industrial 
districts of Italian textiles firms; innovative 
biotechnology firms in Portugal; the clustering of 
call-centres in Dublin or the Randstad in the 
Netherlands; and of course the computer industry 
in California's Silicon Valley. But success stories 
are not easy to copy, not least because by 
definition these niches are already occupied. 
Moreover, a success story can hardly be 
built overnight. 
Another possible option for firms in less 
favoured regions is to try to become 
complementary to activities elsewhere in Europe. 
For example, by sub-contracting or collaborating 
with more advanced firms in a core region. 
Synergies can be exploited through "virtual 
clustering" using ICTs to connect firms in less 
favoured regions directly into the epicentres of 
innovation. This depends on excellent logistic 
capacity for the physical coordination and good 
communication links (transport and ICT). Lead 
sectors in such 'virtualization' strategies are 
automotive manufacturing, electrical engineering, 
and agrofood, with investment and collaborations 
in less favoured regions in both the EU15 and 
candidate countries for EU enlargement. In fact, 
driven largely by integration into the supply chains 
of major European industrial firms, the economies 
of the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) are already showing signs of convergence 
to the industrial specialization profiles of the 
Northern EU countries, (OECD 1998). However, 
these kinds of vertical complementarities leave 
both CEECs and Less Favoured Regions (LFRs) in a 
Table 1. Specialization patterns in peripheral regions 
First wave Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC1) 
Hungary 
Food & drink 
Electrical machinery 
Transport equipment 
Radio/TV 
Chemicals 
Coke/petro-leum 
Wood & paper 
Czech Republic Poland Slovenia 
Food & drink 
Electrical machinen,' 
Transport equipment 
Medical instruments 
Basic and fabricated 
products 
Chemicals 
Mineral products 
Wood and furniture 
Food & drink 
Electrical machinery 
Automobiles 
Radio/TV sets 
Wood & Paper 
Food & drink 
Electrical machinery 
Transport equipment 
Mineral products 
Optical equipment 
Chemicals 
Estonia 
Electrical machinery 
Textiles 
Chemicals 
Wood & paper 
EU-15 less favoured countries/regions 
Ireland 
Pharmaceuticals 
Biomedical equipment 
Office machinery 
Recorded media 
Spain Portugal Southern Italy 
Food & drink 
Transport equipment 
Fabricated products 
Chemicals 
Consumer goods 
Textiles 
Wood and cork 
Software development 
Biotechnology 
Food & drink 
Textiles 
Transport equipment 
Mineral products 
Greece 
Food & drink 
Textiles 
Mineral products 
Source: CEC (1998), EIU (1998), Tsipouri (1999) and OECD (1998). 
There are many stories 
of regions acquiring 
dominance in niche 
markets, but such 
success stories are not 
easy to copy, not least 
because by definition 
these niches are 
already occupied 
m M m M m 
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Globalization will erode 
the competitive 
position of EU firms 
producing low-skill, 
labour-intensive 
commodities. New 
strengths need to be 
sought in more 
knowledge-intensive 
markets rather 
than saturated 
traditional ones 
The regions need 
adequate information 
infrastructures and 
training and education 
initiatives if they are 
to stay in tune with 
the digital age 
dependent or secondary economic position 
relative to the most developed countries of the EU. 
Cooperation and competition among regions: In 
combination, the Single Market, EMU and 
enlargement increase competitive pressures on 
EU15 less favoured regions, whilst at the same time 
signalling a reduction in financial support. 
However, all EU firms have privileged access to 
world markets, which means that the longer-term 
perspective could, on balance, be positive overall. 
But, meanwhile, the urgent need is to modernize 
and to build relations with partners elsewhere in 
Europe in order to use the window of opportunity 
to strengthen their industries and institutions. With 
globalization, the competitive position of EU firms 
producing low-skill labour-intensive commodities 
will be eroded. New strengths need to be sought in 
more knowledge-intensive markets rather than 
saturated traditional ones. As both LFRs and 
enlargement countries need to restructure and 
target key sectors, it is of concern that they do not 
all target the same sectors, as this could lead to 
intense regional level competition for markets and 
investment between them. The specialization 
profiles of first-round Eastern European 
enlargement countries and the main EU countries 
with less favoured regions indicate that this is 
generally not the case, with the exception of 
transport equipment (Table 1). But, there is 
competition for foreign direct investment. Recent 
trends in the distribution of FDI indicate a decline 
in the Southern Member States, and a sharp 
increase in the Eastern enlargement countries 
(IMD). Countries like Hungary and the Czech 
Republic seem to be already equally well, if not 
better, integrated into global production networks 
than some regions in the current EU. 
Preparing for the future... 
The current phase of rapid change both ¡n-
and outside Europe represents a good 
opportunity for less favoured regions to develop 
economically. Digitization wil l not make 
location-related disadvantages disappear. 
Geography will continue to matter because the 
global and digital economy is a space of flows 
that are drawn towards poles of attraction such 
as a high quality infrastructure and appropriately 
skilled labour. The result will be that favoured 
regions will continue to be a strong magnet to 
these flows but a number of countervailing 
trends are also in operation which act in favour 
of more distant and less favoured regions. 
1. An appropriate information infrastructure is 
needed so that regions can connect to the digital 
and global economy. Equally important are 
training and education initiatives to develop a 
workforce (and culture) which is in tune with 
the digital age. Also, the new economic rules in 
markets for intangibles call for a regional 
response. With globalization, governments (at 
national and EU level) have lost direct influence 
over multinational firms. Their leverage now 
tends to be on framework conditions such high-
quality knowledge infrastructure and the 
institutional base. Much of this leverage is 
actually enacted at regional level, thus making 
regional level policies and actors more crucial 
and giving them a higher profile in national 
wealth generation. As Storper (1997) and 
Lundvall (1998) in particular have emphasized, 
the implication is a new wave of policies to 
build "learning regions", in which the 
knowledge base of the region (schools, colleges, 
research, industrial and innovation support) 
come together to support innovation and 
maintain the attractiveness of the region to 
investors. 
2. Regionalization is also apparent in 
industrial structures. There is an overall trend 
towards specialization of regional industrial 
structure. EMU and the enlargement process is 
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likely to enhance trends towards new local 
agglomeration effects (see Krugman, 1995). 
Regions can respond by being selective in 
targeting "foreign" investment and exploiting 
synergies and spill­overs from existing industrial 
strengths. A key component of such strategies is 
to foster a match between the research and 
training infrastructure and the specialization 
profile. This implies analysis of educational 
sector services and appropriate incentives to 
develop the right courses at the technical and 
university level. 
It is also important to match goods and 
services with local market demands, because 
customization is now a key axis of competition. 
This tends to draw economic activities towards 
establishing a physical presence in the regional 
market, so long as the sophistication and level of 
demand makes it worthwhile. Somewhat in 
contrast to the image of a standardized single 
market, the implication is a preference for 
regional growth models based on systematic 
exploitation of proximity and variety. Europe's 
regional diversity surely offers much scope such 
local matching strategies. 
3. Coordinating activities at European level 
could help develop complementarities to 
support these regional specialization strategies. 
An ¡deal division of labour can be imagined 
between Centre, East and South, with 
interconnection between centres of 
specialization rather than head on competition. 
Such ideas raise fundamental questions about 
the future of Europe and suggest a renewed role 
for the European Commission, under the general 
principle of "subsidiarity", less as provider of 
structural funds than as coordinator of regional 
policies. 
4. Such coordinated regional specialization 
strategies may sound promising, but they also 
imply qualitatively different prospects and roles 
for different regions. This conflicts with the 
objectives of cohesion and convergence. Even 
more problematic, there may be regions that fail 
to find a successful niche. Again this points 
towards a regional structural policy less focused 
on monetary transfers and more on assisting 
regions to build the effective institutional and 
industrial systems that attract investment in the 
new digital and global economy. 
Regional specialization 
might benefit from 
coordination at 
European level 
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Openness ín Scientific Advisory 
Committees 
Josephine Anne Ste in, University of East London/PREST 
Issue: Scientific advisory committees can have enormous Influence on setting new 
governmental policies and regulations, as well as on the administration of programmes 
for research and technological development. Pressures to democratize deliberative 
policy­making are leading to various mechanisms to Increase openness and public 
participation in scientific advisory systems. 
Relevance: The benefits of openness, including systematic, balanced expert input, more 
efficient progress through independent external review, and public confidence­building, 
are widely recognized. However, It Is also considered legitimate to protect privacy for 
certain advisory committee functions, for example in conducting scientific peer review 
or for reasons of national security or commercial confidentiality, implementing 
appropriate openness regimes depends on national, political and institutional contexts 
and must be tailored to circumstances. 
introduction 
S cientific advisory committees are an important feature of governance in many industrialized countries, and they are also used by the European Union at supra­
national level. Not only do such committees give 
governments access to high­quality, current 
expertise in highly technical areas, formalized 
external advice helps to ensure that governments 
do not become captive to the ¡η­house interests 
of national laboratories or the civil service, 
or vulnerable to excessive or inappropriate 
political influence. 
Advisory committees are not, of course, the 
only way in which governments receive scientific 
information and opinion. Scientific advisory 
systems typically consist of a complex set of 
internal governmental advisors, and departmental 
and inter­departmental committees, often with a 
chief scientific advisor responsible both for 
coordination and for briefing high­level 
politicians. These internal, executive mechanisms 
are complemented by national academies of 
science and engineering providing advice to 
government, consultancy contracts with outside 
bodies and less formal input from individual 
experts or groups of experts. 
However, scientific advisory committees with 
external expert members are of special interest for 
two main reasons. Firstly, scientific advisory 
committees are used widely as a well­recognized, 
As well as giving 
governments access to 
high­quality current 
expertise in highly 
technical areas, 
scientific advisory 
committees help 
ensure a measure of 
independence from 
specific interests 
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Scientific advisory 
committees tend to 
have formalized terms 
of reference and 
responsibilities that 
lead to a specific set of 
recommend9tions on 
policy matters, 
however, in Europe 
they tend to work 
behind closed doors 
The apparently tight 
relationship between 
science and 
government and the 
crises of confidence 
have provoked calls for 
greater openness 
In the US the Federal 
Advisory Committee 
Act (FACA) grew out of 
public distrust of some 
parts of the scientific 
'establishment' and a 
general crises of 
confidence in the 
aftermath of Vietnam 
and Watergate 
effective forum for bringing independent expertise 
to bear on matters relevant to policy-making 
and administration. Secondly, such committees 
tend to have formalized terms of reference and 
responsibilities that lead to a specific set of 
recommendations on policy matters. Scientific 
advisory committees are not only an institutio-
nalized means for transmitting knowledge, they 
represent a mechanism for opening governmental 
decision-making to direct input from the scientific 
community. In other words, scientific advisory 
committees can be viewed as a democratic 
extension to executive government, by bringing 
scientists in to participate in decision-making 
processes. 
The flip side of the coin, of course, is that with 
the exception of a few committees made 
prominent by public controversies, scientific 
advisory committees in most governmental 
systems conduct their business in private. To those 
outside the ranks of science and government, there 
appears to be an already tight relationship between 
the two; much research is funded, and indeed 
carried out, by the government. Priorities for public 
investment in R&D are largely set through the 
science/ government dynamic (including science-
based industry) without wider consultation. Private 
industrial interests affected by national innovation 
policies and science-based regulation seem to 
enjoy ready access to, and influence upon, 
government by virtue of their economic 
importance. What of the public interest, more 
generally? 
Crises in public confidence in traditional 
democratic institutions often provoke demand for 
the greater public accountability of governments. 
Privileged access to government by any special 
interest group - such as science is increasingly 
perceived to be - is viewed by some with 
suspicion. When public confidence is also shaken 
over science-based policies, such as those 
concerned with "mad cow" disease (BSE) and 
genetic engineering, it is natural that this demand 
for greater accountability is extended to scientific 
advisory processes. The most obvious way to 
achieve this is to extent the idea of open 
government to greater openness in scientific 
advisory committees. 
In countries as diverse as Australia, Germany, 
Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the 
USA, and in the European Community, there is a 
clear trend towards greater openness in scientific 
advisory committees, though the extent and 
the mechanisms differ. Openness is being 
implemented both through formal procedures and 
informally, by more careful attention to 
stakeholder representation on committees, for 
example, by developing rules on conflict of 
interest, or by publishing information about the 
committee's membership, deliberations and 
findings. Public participation is increasingly 
common, often using the Internet, and often at the 
initiative of the scientists themselves. 
We will look here at the implications of these 
trends with special reference to the European 
Union, where recent developments in the 
organization and operation of scientific advisory 
committees are breaking new ground in 
democratizing the policy-making process. 
Scientific advisory committees in the 
united States 
The United States has by far the longest and 
most comprehensive tradition of openness in its 
scientific advisory committees. In the aftermath of 
Watergate and the Vietnam War, a number of 
reforms were instituted in the USA in the 1970s to 
improve Congressional oversight and control over 
the activities of the Executive Branch of the US 
Government. This period of American history 
was also characterized by mounting public 
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distrust of the medical, industrial and nuclear 
"establishments" and the scientific enterprise 
underpinning them. One reform to arise from this 
dual public disquiet was the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act of 1972 (FACA), which stipulated 
that each expert advisory committee serving 
Federal Agencies must: 
• have a charter specifying its purpose, term and 
mission objectives 
• be certified as balanced by the Federal Agency 
to which it is responsible 
• be opened and adjourned by a Federal official 
• publicize its meetings in advance 
• meet in public with certain well-defined 
exceptions which must be made public 
• publish agendas in advance and publish 
minutes of all meetings 
• report its activities annually to Congress 
• make public recommendations. 
The emphasis of the FACA is on openness but 
under the 1976 "Sunshine" provisions, committees 
can hold closed or partially closed meetings for 
discussions concerning: 
• trade secrets (commercially confidential 
information) 
• national security or foreign policy 
• personal privacy (including conflict of interest) 
• agency personnel rules. 
However, FACA committees are still required 
to give notice of the meeting and to specify in 
advance which portions of the meeting will be 
closed and why. In addition, the minutes of all 
meetings must be made public, and ultimately, so 
must the conclusions and recommendations of 
the committees. 
Although not required to do so, many FACA 
committees reserve time for public input on their 
meeting agendas. Committees often give the 
address of an agency contact person or provide a 
feedback link on the Internet. Public participation 
is significant in many instances, but is not 
systematic and is not always welcomed by 
committee members. 
Federal Agencies with responsibility for 
national security tend to have more secretive 
cultures, and this extends to the scientific advisory 
process. The Department of Energy, with 
responsibility for nuclear weapons, has come in 
for persistent criticism for its reluctance to engage 
with the public. This secretive culture was even 
criticized in the DOE's "Openness Panel", 
reporting to the Secretary of Energy Advisory 
Board, which chose to comply with FACA even 
though not required to do so. The Openness 
Panel organized a series of Workshops where 
members of the public could express their views. 
The public raised concerns, for example, that the 
membership of the Panel was dominated by pro-
nuclear industry interests, recommending the 
appointment of a "public advocate". 
In some cases, US scientific advisory 
committees can have an explicit mandate to reach 
out to the public. For example, the Presidential 
Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' 
Illnesses was as active in promoting health services 
and benefits to veterans as in investigating the 
epidemiological and medical aspects of military 
service in the Gulf War. The seven subcommittees 
were not technically subject to FACA, but sought 
public involvement through written submissions, 
attendance at regular meetings, and at dedicated 
meetings with veterans and other members of 
the public. 
A controversy in 1997 over FACA's 
applicability to the US National Academies 
advisory committees was resolved successfully by 
enacting new legislation, but it prompted a re­
examination of the underlying principles and 
practices pertaining to FACA. It is generally 
acknowledged that FACA needs some updating 
\ \ 1 3 
In the US openness has 
been enshrined in 
committee rules, 
particularly those 
covered by the FACA, 
although there is 
resistance to it 
in some areas 
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It is generally 
acknowledged that 
FACA needs some 
updating and reform 
to reflect experience 
gained over the past 
quarter century, and 
the possibilities 
afforded by advances 
in information 
technology 
There are moves 
towards greater 
openness in a number 
of countries, but 
particularly in those 
which have recently 
suffered crises 
of confidence 
and reform to reflect (1) the experience gained 
over the past quarter century, and (2) the 
possibilities afforded by advances in information 
technology. 
The main unresolved issues (and some would 
say, unresolvable issues) all concern the practice 
rather than the principle of applying FACA. Thus, 
dissatisfaction has been expressed with the use of 
Congressional exemptions, perceived circumven­
tion of FACA or misuse of committees by US 
Federal Agencies, and the implementation of 
appropriate balance in committee membership. 
On the other hand, discretionary compliance with 
FACA, and voluntary initiatives to improve public 
participation in S&T advisory processes, are very 
common, and demonstrate a commitment to 
openness that goes well beyond formal, legal 
requirements. 
Twenty-five years of experience of FACA 
openness provisions have reached a state of 
maturity that, to a first approximation, satisfies the 
needs of the government, the expert community 
and citizens. Americans have come to expect and 
to rely upon openness in S&T advisory committees 
as an established feature of democratic 
governance. Rather than trusting the government, 
or trusting the experts, they have come, for the 
most part, to trust the FACA regime itself. 
Experience in other countries 
In countries such as Australia, Germany, 
Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, 
steps are being taken to improve openness in 
scientific advisory committees. Beyond that 
however, many countries are formalizing 
committee membership criteria, including non-
scientific attributes such as sectoral, institutional 
or geographical representation in addition to 
scientific expertise, and some make informal 
reference to gender balance. 
Countries are also publishing more 
information, such as the names and affiliations of 
scientific experts on committees, committee 
reports, and national S&T data and policies that 
form a common basis for decision-making. Some, 
most notably the smaller countries, provide for 
international review, and a number of countries 
are developing guidelines on conflict of interest 
for committee members1. 
The greatest impetus towards increased 
openness is observed in countries like Japan and 
the United Kingdom, where there have been 
crises of public confidence in the integrity of 
government officials (often over financial matters 
or conflicts of interest), and over science-based 
policies (nuclear energy in Japan; BSE in the 
United Kingdom). 
Voluntary measures to increase openness in 
scientific advisory committees are common in 
many countries. Some are initiated by 
governments, by individual officials, or by the 
scientific advisory committees themselves. Some 
committees organize public consultation meetings 
or invite public participation in regular meetings. 
Others publicize their activity through the press. 
But the most common means to increase openness 
is through the development of Websites, many of 
which not only include information and contact 
points but allow for public submission of evidence 
or questions to the committees. 
Science advisory committees in the 
European Community 
Scientific advisory committees made up of 
independent experts are often used to advise the 
European Commission on "upstream" policy 
development, for example to help set research 
priorities in the Framework Programme. However, 
some expert committees, most notably in 
DG-XXIV (Consumer policy and protection of the 
© IPTS - JRC - Seville, 1999 
N o . 3 9 N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 9 T h e I P T S R e p o r t 
consumer; see below), provide independent 
scientific advice on the development of 
regulation, a downstream activity. 
In addition, the European Commission is 
advised by a set of committees with formal 
responsibility for representing the interests of the 
Member States. These "institutional" committees 
consist of "comitology committees", such as those 
associated with the Framework Programme, and 
committees moderating between the Commission 
and the Council of Ministers (CREST, COREPER). 
There are three main types of "comitology" 
committee serving the European Commission 
(based on a 1987 Decision that is currently 
under review): "management", "regulatory", and, 
somewhat confusingly, "advisory" committees 
(see table 1), which in this context has a technical, 
legal meaning. Those associated with the 
Framework Programme are variants of 
"regulatory" committees, known as " l l lb" ; 
however, many others advising on highly 
scientific or technological issues, such as the 
Standing Veterinary Committee and the 
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products, 
operate under a different set of rules. The legalities 
are exceedingly complex, but in general, these 
committees have traditionally operated behind 
closed doors, with minimal information 
concerning their work accessible to the public. 
In practice, the functional delineations of these 
committees are not always clear. The distinction 
between upstream and downstream are necessarily 
blurred. One cannot advise on future research 
activities without taking into account the 
scientific achievements and evaluations of current 
research programmes; recommendations on 
management of the present and the future cannot 
be separated neatly. 
More controversially, however, in some 
committees, especially the "comitology" 
committees, the distinction between advisory and 
executive functions can become blurred, especially 
where policy on research programme management 
and regulation is concerned. 
The European science advisory system is 
shown schematically in Figure 1. 
Little systematic information has been made 
available on the membership, mandates or 
deliberations of European scientific advisory 
committees. Meetings are normally closed to the 
public. Examining the links between the 
Commission, other European institutions and 
outside expertise (as shown in Figure 1) reveals 
the flow of information to be almost entirely 
inward. Links to the Parliament, the wider policy 
community and the public are almost entirely 
limited to publication of some final reports, 
special discussion meetings in the Member States 
and occasional European policy forums. 
The European Commission has recently taken 
a number of initiatives concerning EC scientific 
advisory committees. A July 1997 Decision 
established a set of eight Scientific Advisory 
Committees and a Scientific Steering Committee 
to advise DG-XXIV on consumer health and food 
Table 1. European commission S&T Advisory committees 
Consultative, independent 
Institutional 
Upstream 
DG-XII Expert Committees 
CREST, COREPER 
Research Croup 
Downstream 
DC-XXIV Scientific Committees 
FWP Programme Committees: 
"comitology" committees 
15 
m 
In Europe, scientific 
advisory committees 
are often used to 
advise the European 
Commission on 
"upstream" policy 
development. There 
are also a series of 
committees with 
formal responsibility 
for representing the 
interests of the 
Member States 
European Commission 
committees have 
tended to be fairly 
restrictive about 
citizens' access to 
information, moreover 
the distinction 
between advisory 
and executive 
functions 
can sometimes 
become blurred 
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The European 
Commission has 
recently taken a 
number of initiatives 
concerning EC scientific 
advisory committees. 
The proposed reforms 
would create a more 
systematic, open and 
transparent framework 
for their activities 
Figure 1. European community S&T Policy "Trialogue" 
Task Forces 
Comitology 
Committees 
Cellule, JRC/IPTS, ETAN 
European 
C o m m i s s i o n 
ESTA, IRDAC 
Expert Committees 
CREST 
COREPER 
Research Group 
Council of 
Ministers 
National Governments 
Conciliation 
European 
Parliament 
RTD & Energy Cmte 
STOA 
Key: 
Cellule [Cellule de Prospective (Forward Studies Unit), European Commission], COREPER 
(Committee of Permanent Representatives], CREST [Comité Scientifique et Technique], ESTA 
(European Science and Technology Assembly], ETAN [European Technology Assessment Network], 
IPTS [Institute for Prospective Technological Studies!, IRDAC [industrial R&D Advisory Committee], 
JRC (Joint Research Centres!, RTD [Research and Technological Development!, STOA [Science and 
Technology Options Assessment, European Parliament!. 
safety. These nine downstream committees have 
unprecedented provisions for openness in the 
European science advisory system. 
In June 1998, the Commission announced the 
formation of 17 new research advisory groups to 
advise on the research to be carried out through 
the "key actions" of the Fifth Framework 
Programme. These new committees operate 
under a much more open regime than earlier 
expert committees advising on previous 
Framework Programmes, with information about 
the new committees publicized and posted on the 
Internet. Also in June, the Commission announced 
a proposal for a Council decision to update the 
1987 "comitology" Decision. 
Under these reforms, both main types of 
scientific advisory committee serving the European 
Commission (i.e. (1) consultative, independent 
committees; and (2) institutional, "comitology" 
committees) would operate under more systematic, 
open and transparent rules. However, the detailed 
roles of these committees, and the institutional 
bodies such as CREST and COREPER with respect 
to both "upstream" and "downstream" decision-
making, remain to be clarified. 
Conclusions 
Greater openness in scientific advisory 
committees is often instituted primarily in 
response to public distrust of government and/or 
science. Openness is also stimulated by general 
demand for more responsive democracy and/or 
the possibilities for public participation afforded 
by advances in information and communications 
technologies. 
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To focus on scientific advisory committees, 
rather than on scientific advisory systems as a 
whole, can be justified on the basis that any non­
executive advisory committee given a formal 
mandate to provide recommendations to 
government can be held separately accountable 
in the interests of more robust democracy. 
The benefits of openness, including 
systematic, balanced expert input, more efficient 
progress through independent peer review and 
public confidence­building, are now widely 
recognized. However, approaches to openness 
that are too invasive or prescriptive could 
exacerbate the incentive to bypass formal 
mechanisms to obtain expert advice, and might 
inhibit governments from seeking outside advice 
altogether. Clearly, demand for openness must be 
balanced with the need to avoid overly 
burdensome procedures, and the need to protect 
legitimate aspects of privacy and confidentiality. 
Although the characteristics of scientific 
advisory systems differ from country to country, 
certain issues underpin the management of the 
balance between openness, effectiveness and 
confidentiality in scientific advisory committees. 
These include, for example: 
• Definition of mandate and impacts of 
recommendations 
• Independence of expertise and avoidance of 
conflicts of interest 
• Balance of expertise and stakeholder 
representation 
• Protection of confidential information 
(personal, national and commercial) 
• Compliance with openness provisions, 
exemptions and sanctions 
• Publication of membership, minutes, working 
papers and recommendations 
• Public involvement in deliberative processes 
• Management of research policy as it relates to 
S&T­based regulation 
• Role of external advice in "upstream" vs. 
"downstream" governmental functions 
• Parliamentary role and inter­institutional 
relations 
The American experience has demonstrated 
that openness in scientific advisory committees, 
with a carefully designed set of exemptions and 
protections, increases public confidence in both 
the scientific advisory process and in government 
itself. A number of other countries, in Europe and 
beyond, are increasing openness, most commonly 
by formalizing stakeholder representation on 
scientific advisory committees. Public participation 
in deliberative exercises conducted by scientific 
advisory committees is everywhere becoming more 
common, especially through interactive Websites. 
The use of Websites is still experimental even 
in the USA where there has been the greatest use 
of the medium. A truly interactive, Web­based 
deliberative exercise involving the public has yet 
to be organized. The extent to which this type of 
activity would represent a true expansion of 
democracy or an extension of influence to select 
elites or unrepresentative interests cannot yet be 
determined without dedicated research. 
Furthermore, the extent to which large volumes of 
public information related to scientific advisory 
committees (such as detailed minutes of all 
meetings and comprehensive postings of 
evidence submitted by the public) is genuinely 
enlightening is also open to question. 
At the European level, recent initiatives and 
proposals by the European Commission provide a 
good basis for systematizing and developing 
openness in all types of European scientific 
advisory committees. However, the all­important 
details are far from resolved. 
European research support, as it takes into 
account socio­economic as well as scientific 
■é < 
Approaches to 
openness that are too 
invasive or prescriptive 
could exacerbate the 
incentive to bypass 
formal mechanisms to 
obtain expert advice, 
and might inhibit 
governments from 
seeking outside 
advice altogether 
The American 
experience has 
demonstrated that 
openness in scientific 
advisory committees, 
with a carefully 
designed set of 
exemptions and 
protections, increases 
public confidence in 
both the scientific 
advisory process and in 
government itself 
m m m m m 
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objectives, has separated "purely scientific" 
deliberations associated with peer review from 
decision-making on project funding, in which 
"comitology" committees play a role. Also, 
committees advising the European Commission 
on science and technology policy issues are not 
"purely executive" as they include external 
experts. There is thus strong justification for 
openness provisions to apply uniformly to all 
types of European scientific advisory committee. 
Public participation in European deliberations 
may be difficult to implement simply through 
making scientific advisory committee meetings 
more open, due to the many geographical, 
cultural and linguistic barriers involved. It is also 
not clear that it would be appropriate to open 
such meetings to the public, as many expert 
members might be intimidated by the idea of 
speaking a second or third language in the full 
glare of public and media attention. However, 
deliberative exercises work best if there is 
adequate time for information-gathering, 
analysis, and the interchange of ideas. As the 
Internet becomes more accessible to ordinary 
citizens, its potential as a transmission medium 
that can accommodate different languages 
through translation codd potentially bring 
participation within reach of citizens anywhere 
in Europe. 
The climate is propitious for the implemen­
tation of greater openness in European scientific 
advisory committees. The successful development 
of the European Union depends upon the 
responsiveness of European institutions to the 
citizen; overcoming public concern over issues 
such as biotechnology implies a need for better 
flows of information between the scientific 
community, government and the citizen. Greater 
openness in scientific advisory committees is one 
way to address both needs simultaneously. -Λ 
Keywords 
science advice, openness, expert committees, public participation, policy 
Note 
1- Consensus conferences or similar exercises have been conducted in Denmark, France, Germany, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the USA. These exercises, in general, 
reverse the roles of expert and lay citizen by locating the deliberative process in the lay panel, which is 
informed by expert testimony. These exercises, while not technically part of the scientific advisory 
process, nevertheless indicate a growing tendency to engage the public in highly scientific or technical 
policy issues. 
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Trade liberalization 
is creating an 
environment in 
which competitive 
pressures are 
constantly intensifying. 
The skills and training 
of their employees will 
be decisive for firms' 
continued survival 
Education and Training for 
innovation: individual and 
organizational learning 
Peter Senker, SPRU/lPRA 
Issue: Efforts to remove barriers to the widespread uptake of Information and 
communication technology products (ICTs) have tended to concentrate on skills 
shortages. However, particularly in the less prosperous regions, another significant 
problem is failure of SMEs In traditional industries to modernize their products and 
processes to exploit the potential of the wide range of new scientific, technological 
and management techniques which would allow them to increase productivity and 
Improve quality. 
Relevance: Education and training policy proposals for the Information Society 
emphasize the need to educate people to fill the enormous number of vacancies in ICT 
producing Industries. The Commission also has several important programmes and 
proposals which will help less prosperous regions. But most such programmes operate 
by increasing the supply of suitably educated and trained workers, in addition, 
programmes are needed to address another key Issue bringing to the surface the latent 
demand among SMEs for highly qualified people needed to stimulate innovation. 
introduction 
R ecent advances in technologies - ICTs in particular - have accelerated already rapidly changing skill requirements. Such trends require policies of continuous 
upgrading of the skills of the labour force - i.e. the 
"lifelong learning imperative". They also require 
programmes to ensure that companies, especially 
the enormous number of SMEs in traditional 
sectors, are capable of innovation so as to be 
able to modernize their products, production 
processes and/or services to take full advantage of 
the productivity and quality improvements made 
possible by ICTs. 
Trade liberalization is creating an environment 
in which competitive pressures are constantly 
intensifying, and in which firms - including SMEs -
have very strong incentives to employ more skilled 
and trained workers in order to remain competitive. 
Indeed, the future looks bleak for firms that fail to 
do so. European policies aimed at encouraging 
SMEs to employ more skilled workers could help 
them to prepare for more intensively competitive 
market conditions, thereby alleviating future pain. 
Current European Commission proposals 
The European Commission is striving to develop 
programmes to meet the rapidly growing demand 
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for educated people with ICT experience which 
seems likely to continue to afflict this important and 
rapidly growing sector. It has called for a new 
strategy for jobs in the Information Society: 
"The rise of information and communication 
technologies is the defining socio-economic 
development of the late 20th. century, influencing 
not only jobs, industrial output and the relative 
economic performance of nations, but also the 
way people live." 
The ICT sector created 400,000 new jobs 
between 1995 and 1997 - about one in four of the 
total of new jobs created in the EU(ESF, 1999). 
Trends such as the rapid expansion of mobile 
telephone usage and growth in the audio-visual 
sector indicate that there continue to be major 
opportunities for employment expansion. 
Over 500,000 IT job vacancies are currently 
unfilled in the EU because employers cannot find 
staff with the appropriate skills. This figure could 
rise to 1.2 million by 2002 unless the problem 
is addressed as a matter of urgency (ESF, 1999). 
As a consequence of these skills shortages, firms 
do not derive the full benefits available from 
their ICT systems and have to postpone new 
technology projects. 
individuals need to learn - but so do firms 
Before considering how to increase firms' 
capacity to acquire knowledge and skills, it is 
necessary to consider why firms need to learn, 
how they learn, and the principal priorities in their 
needs for new knowledge to help them to 
innovate effectively. 
In addition to measures designed to ensure that 
individuals learn, it is also necessary to ensure 
that firms learn. Research has shown that it is not 
enough for individuals to learn about ICT: indeed, 
it has been found to be dangerous for a firm to 
place excessive reliance on individual ICT experts 
(Dale, 1986). The organization as a whole must 
learn to use ICT, so that it can draw upon its 
employees' complex blend of skills and talents. 
A key part of the learning process is the 
identification of information which can add 
value to the business, and integrating new 
knowledge into a company's existing accumulated 
knowledge (Tiler, 1991). 
Most firms in the less advanced regions of the 
EU are SMEs, and most operate in traditional 
sectors. Indeed, in the EU as a whole, small firms 
employing less than 50 people account for about 
half of total employment - some 50 million jobs, 
and SMEs employing up to 250 people account 
for about 65% of employment (Eurostat, 1997). 
Increasingly, such firms can only remain 
competitive if they learn to innovate. Often this 
involves learning to use ICT equipment and 
systems in their production processes, and/or in 
their products or services. 
There are huge opportunities for SMEs to use 
new technology to increase both productivity and 
quality - just a few examples are the application 
of Computer-Aided Design in foundries, the 
use of computer-controlled cutting in garment 
production, the use of production control in 
food and drink production and in crockery 
manufacture, and the use of computers to control 
stocks in retailing. 
Where firms in traditional sectors do use new 
technology, they often use technology that is 
produced by their materials and equipment 
suppliers, and sub-contractors rely on their 
customers for precise specifications. But there is 
extensive evidence that firms which do not 
employ qualified scientists or engineers have 
great difficulty in absorbing knowledge from 
such external sources. Most firms in traditional 
sectors such as construction, food, plastics, 
if» 
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Providing the 
financial support 
for modernization 
of machinery cannot 
provide firms with the 
capability for effective 
innovation if they do 
not have the skills and 
knowledge necessary 
to use the new 
technology 
clothing and mechanical engineering were 
founded by practical people, few of whom yet 
recognize or understand the need for graduates 
or technicians in scientific, technological or 
management disciplines. If there is nobody in a 
firm who can understand the knowledge 
generated in universities and Research Institutes, 
then the firm cannot use such knowledge. Firms 
cannot innovate effectively unless they employ 
staff who understand science, technology and 
modern management methods, and are able to 
apply them. But it is not sufficient for a firm to 
gain access to useful knowledge. It has also to 
organize methods for the internal diffusion of 
new knowledge and skills, to ensure that 
knowledge which is received from external 
sources is communicated and utilized effectively 
throughout the organization. In the absence of 
the knowledge needed to be able to use new 
machinery, the provision of financial support for 
modernization of machinery by itself cannot 
provide firms with the capability for effective 
innovation. If firms do not have appropriately 
educated and trained workers, financial support 
cannot ensure that they acquire the ability to use 
new machinery effectively, or to modernize 
products, services or production processes. 
The principal factor constraining firms' 
demand for scientific and technological 
knowledge is their own lack of scientific and 
technological capability. Universities play an 
important role in producing new knowledge and 
in educating students. But firms can only gain 
access to such knowledge if they employ people 
capable of reading the textbooks, journals and 
manuals in which it is published, and 
communicating directly with the people who 
produce it. There is a considerable amount of 
empirical research data which demonstrates that 
this capability is related to the educational level 
of a firm's staff - in particular to the employment 
of qualified scientists and engineers able to 
understand the output in terms of books and 
papers produced by the universities and 
Research Institutes which generate new 
technology (Entorf 1997, and IRDAC 1991). 
Qualified staff can also participate in personal 
discussions with people who generate new 
knowledge. In principle, the higher the level of 
knowledge and understanding within the 
company (the more elevated its skills profile) the 
more aware the staff is that new knowledge 
could help their business; and the better they are 
able to use new knowledge to improve the 
company's competitiveness. 
EU and individual Government policies 
primarily focus on encouraging individuals to 
learn throughout their working lives. This is very 
necessary to encourage economic development, 
but it is not sufficient by itself. Increasing the 
capacity of SMEs to locate useful new 
knowledge and technology and to apply it 
appropriately to their businesses has been 
relatively neglected. Particularly in less 
prosperous regions, one of the principal 
problems detracting from the European Union's 
competitiveness is the failure of SMEs in 
traditional industries to modernize their products 
and processes by means of new technology. The 
Commission has programmes and proposals 
aimed at helping such regions, the vast majority 
of which operate by increasing the supply of 
suitably educated and trained people. However, 
the failure of SMEs to demand highly qualified 
workers is of at least equal significance to their 
capacity to innovate. 
In view of the enormous size of the SME 
sector in terms of employment; and in view of 
the very large share of overall employment in 
SMEs in traditional sectors, sustaining and 
increasing this employment by enabling SMEs to 
use new science, technology and management 
methods effectively deserves high priority. 
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How firms' learning capacity can be 
stimulated 
Effective innovation, leading to improvements 
in productivity and quality, is the key objective of 
enhancing firms' learning capacity. This involves 
learning to use new science and technology in 
their products, processes and services, and 
learning to use new management methods. To do 
this, it is necessary to encourage firms to recruit 
new categories of staff, in particular technicians, 
graduates and postgraduates in scientific and 
technological disciplines such as ICT which are 
relevant to development of new activities. Such 
recruits have greater capability than existing less 
qualified staff for acquiring the knowledge needed 
to implement new technology. It is true that, in 
addition to universities, several Research Institutes 
in European countries offer scientific and 
technological knowledge to firms. But such 
Institutes' efforts to promote innovation are 
relatively ineffective because far too few SMEs 
employ sufficient people with the capability or 
knowledge to permit them to take full advantage of 
their services. 
One example of an attempt to address this 
issue directly is given by the British Teaching 
Company Scheme (TCS). TCS sets up partnerships 
between academic institutions and companies to 
benefit industry through the development of a 
group of high quality, young, technical managers. 
The Scheme operates through programmes in 
which academics in universities team up with 
companies to contribute to the implementation of 
strategies for technical or managerial change. 
Each partnership, called a TCS programme, 
involves academic participation with company 
managers in the joint supervision and direction of 
the work of at least one young graduate in a 
relevant discipline. A high proportion of these 
programmes have involved the application of 
ICTs to the development of better products, 
services and production processes, but they 
have also been effective in many other areas 
including new materials and biotechnology. 
In firms which have not previously recruited 
graduate scientists or engineers, a TCS programme 
can put in place an organizational mechanism 
which initiates knowledge transfer from academia. 
It can also play a significant role in creating more 
favourable attitudes to the recruitment of such 
graduates (Senker, 1994). Firms can enhance their 
capability to learn and innovate by recruiting the 
graduate Associates who work for them on 
Teaching Company Schemes. Their education and 
training also provides these graduates with the 
competence and contacts necessary to continue to 
'network' outside the firm - with university staff 
and with personnel from other firms. In this way, 
they can acquire knowledge which can help their 
firm to continue to innovate. 
Similar schemes have also been run in other 
European countries - in EUNET club member 
countries - Denmark, France, and Ireland. 
Agencies in these countries joined forces with 
agencies in Austria, Germany, Norway and 
Sweden (with observers from the Czech Republic) 
to cooperate in 'T3net' a two-year project funded 
by the European Commission which ended 
recently. Their principal activities included 
international technology transfer fellowships, 
further promotion of the technology transfer and 
training concept;· and provision of familiarization 
courses for officials of agencies wishing to 
establish similar programmes. It was suggested that 
"Given their almost universal success, it is not 
unreasonable to foresee the spread of programmes 
combining technology transfer and training 
throughout Europe and beyond" (Monniot, 1998). 
SMEs' capacity to absorb new science, 
technology and management methods needs to be 
stimulated. This can be achieved by increasing their 
willingness to recruit people with the necessary 
t 
A number of initiatives 
have been run in 
Europe to set up 
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develop a group of 
high quality, young, 
technical managers 
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As well as recruiting 
people with the right 
skills, firms need to 
learn how to organize 
themselves so as to 
spread new knowledge 
internally and ensure 
that knowledge 
received from 
external sources is 
communicated and 
utilized effectively 
throughout 
the company 
One approach is to 
apply the concept 
of 'extension' to 
manufacturing, 
as has been done in 
the United States -
appropriately educated 
and trained workers go 
out to manufacturing 
firms and help them 
to reshape their 
organizations to 
facilitate learning 
education and training in relation to science, 
technology and new management methods. At the 
same time, they need help in learning how to 
organize themselves so as to spread new 
knowledge internally and ensure that knowledge 
received from external sources is communicated 
and utilized effectively throughout the company. 
Some organizations, such as the British 
Teaching Company Scheme, fulfil this function, 
and similar organizations operate in several other 
European countries, mainly the more prosperous 
ones. But the success of specific organizational 
mechanisms depends on the culture and 
institutions of the particular countries in which 
they are located. For example the capabilities and 
motivations of those who work in higher education 
and in Research Institutes vary between countries. 
There are variations between countries in the ways 
in which universities are run and financed. For this 
reason, and because of differences in culture 
between countries, it is much easier to persuade 
academics in universities in some countries to 
devote their time and attention to the needs of 
manufacturing industry than it is in others. 
Moreover, in some countries, it is very difficult -
perhaps impossible - for Governments to establish, 
foster and sustain organizations with the high 
degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Teaching 
Company Directorate which runs Teaching 
Company Schemes in Britain. 
For such reasons, it is not always possible 
simply to transfer organizational mechanisms 
which work well in one country to every other 
European country. For organizations to be 
effective, they need to be tailored to the culture 
and political institutions of the countries in which 
they operate. This highlights the need for 
organizational innovation on a European scale. 
Organizational innovation is as necessary to 
economic development as are scientific progress 
and technological innovation. 
To meet the needs identified would involve 
resource-intensive programmes and actions to 
develop, design and pilot new types of 
organization. One possible approach could be to 
seek to apply the concept of "extension" to 
manufacturing, and perhaps to service sectors in 
Europe. Agricultural extension workers have 
been highly successful in modernizing 
agriculture in several countries including the 
United States by going out to farmers to promote 
the use of new technology actively. There are 
schemes to apply the concept of 'extension' to 
manufacturing in the United States -
appropriately educated and trained workers go 
out to manufacturing firms and help them to 
reshape their organizations to facilitate learning. 
The Manufacturing Extension programme was 
developed to support the innovative capacities of 
SME manufacturers within a region. Support 
included individual project engineering, training 
courses and assistance in selecting software and 
equipment (Crow, 1998). Such approaches could 
be adapted to suit some countries in Europe, and 
could provide the basis for the design of effective 
organizations on the scale necessary to meet the 
needs outlined here. 
There is, therefore, an urgent need for 
research and development followed by pilot 
schemes to establish organizations able to fulfil 
such functions in member countries, especially in 
those where conditions are unfavourable for 
application of Teaching Company type 
approaches. 
Conclusion 
In order to stimulate the European economy it 
is important to increase the ability of SMEs to 
innovate. This requires them to learn about new 
scientific, technological and management 
developments so that they can apply them 
effectively. This need cannot be met solely by 
©IPTS-JRC -Seville, 1999 
N o . 3 9 N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 9 T h e I P T S R e p o r t 
the provision of appropriate education and if SMEs' demand for people with knowledge of 
training to individuals - although it will become new scientific and technological developments 
even more necessary for individuals throughout is stimulated by measures such as those 
Europe to be better educated in particular fields proposed here. _J)V 
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European Agriculture and Future 
world Food Demand 
Miguel Vega, IPTS, Laurent Bontoux, DC-XII, Manfred Kern, Agrevo 
issue: There is a consensus among experts that world demand for agricultural food 
products will grow significantly over the next few decades and some estimates even 
suggest it will double over the next twenty years. This is creating strategic challenges for 
European agriculture with consequences for European food production, transformation 
and trading structures, with Its capacity to generate large food surpluses and to 
manufacture high quality food products, the European agrofood sector is well placed to 
take a leading position in the world against strong international competition. 
Relevance: in the context of Agenda 2000, the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
Is being reshaped to address the challenges of the next century. Significant factors to be 
taken into account on the world scene are local and regional conflicts, migrations, 
globalization and the WTO constraints, the eastward enlargement of the European Union, 
sustainable development and increased world food demand. In such a complex situation, 
short-term considerations must not prevent actors and policy-makers from succeeding 
with CAP reform and ensuring the sustainable competitiveness of European agriculture. 
Introduction 
In the past, the so-called "Green Revolution", based on a combination of plant breeding, use of fertilizers and pesticides, better agricultural know-how and irrigation, has 
enabled mankind to keep up with a rapidly 
increasing food demand. Today, whether one 
agrees with the optimists (Dyson, 1996) or the 
pessimists (Brown, 1994) about the predictions 
for food needs in the 21st century, it is absolutely 
essential that we keep up the rate of increase in 
food production seen in the past if we are to 
stand a chance of feeding the world population 
in the decades to come. Unfortunately, most 
easy gains in agricultural productivity have 
already been achieved and a slowdown in 
agricultural yield gains is already being 
registered. 
While 840 million people are estimated to go 
hungry in the world today -despite the fact that 
overall production would suffice for all- the 
USDA (1998) forecasts that 1,140 million people 
could be facing starvation by 2007. This means 
there is more than food production at stake. 
Distribution infrastructures, political stability and 
economic development are also major factors. 
This article intends to highlight the main trends 
impacting food demand and address the capacity 
of agriculture to respond to the pressure. 
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Factors increasing world food demand 
• Population growth and demographic changes 
Studies by leading scientists and 
organizations such as the UN, the World 
Bank and UNESCO have forecast significant 
increases in world population. These 
estimates suggest world population will 
increase from its present 5.7 billion to about 
8 billion in the next 25 years, with further 
increases expected thereafter (see Figure 1). 
Some estimates put the world population at 
11 or 12 billion by 2050! This fact automati­
cally implies increased demand for food. 
Additionally, this increase in population will 
not be uniform around the world, but will be 
concentrated in the tropics and subtropics, 
which are home most of the world's 
biodiversity and where agricultural land is 
already limited, meaning that bringing more 
land under cultivation is likely to be at the 
expense of forest areas. 
Income growth 
About a hundred years ago Americans and 
Europeans began to step up meat production. 
Cereals for direct consumption were gradually 
replaced by cereals for animal feed. In post­
war Germany, for example, the general rule 
was meat once a week if possible, whereas it 
is now meat every day. In all industrialized 
countries, every increase in GDP over the last 
century has been accompanied by a parallel 
increase in meat consumption. High meat 
consumption has become a reality for about 
500 million people worldwide and is one of 
the signs of economic success. 
A further two billion people currently live in 
countries which have enjoyed sustained 
economic growth and are well on their way up 
the economic ladder. Throughout the world, it 
is therefore likely that eating habits will 
continue to shift from primarily vegetarian 
Figure 1. Expected world population growth over the next 40 years 
(in billions of people, estimations from the World Bank, 1998) 
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Growth in world 
population will 
automatically boost 
demand for food. 
However, the fact 
that growth will be 
concentrated areas 
where agricultural land 
is limited will generate 
even greater pressure 
In all industrialized 
countries every 
increase in GDP has 
brought with it a 
parallel increase in 
meat consumption. 
Throughout the world, 
it is likely that eating 
habits will continue to 
shift from primarily 
vegetarian diets to 
high­calorie, meat­
based ones as 
economies prosper 
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The concentrated 
nature of animal raising 
industries makes them 
vulnerable to 
epidemics sometimes 
leading to large-scale 
' culls, and as a result to 
large losses of high 
value food raw material 
The shift in 
consumption patterns 
compounds the 
problem of an overall 
increase in demand as, 
for example, it takes 
around 7 calories in the 
form of cereals to 
produce each calorie in 
the form of beef 
According to FAO 
estimates, 
improvements in 
agricultural production 
in the former Soviet 
countries could turn 
them into net 
exporters by 2010 
diets to high-calorie, meat-based ones as 
economies prosper. These preferences will 
sustain the important growth of the livestock 
sector in developing countries and this will 
continue to drive rapid growth in the 
consumption of cereals as feeds, which will 
perhaps double by the year 2010. The US 
Department of Agriculture expects an increase 
in world animal products demand from 77 Mt 
in 1970 to about 250 Mt in 2007. 
• Consumer preferences and other factors 
Beyond the general trend towards consuming 
more meat as GDP grows, other socio-
economic factors influence change. High-
income consumers in OECD countries want to 
devote less time to the purchasing and 
preparation of food and are willing to pay for 
convenience. Wealthy customers also demand 
freshness and prefer the best cuts of meat, 
possibly leading to wasting of second choice 
or low status pieces. 
A preference for meat in countries able to 
afford it gives rise to intensive animal raising 
industries. The concentrated nature of these 
industries makes them vulnerable to epidemics, 
sometimes leading to large-scale culls, and as a 
result to large losses of high value food raw 
material. Human health risks can at the same 
time be significant, as the recent examples of 
porcine encephalitis in Malaysia, chicken flu in 
Hong Kong and bovine spongiform encepha-
lopathy (BSE, or "mad cow disease) in Europe 
have revealed. 
Meat consumption, a compounding factor 
The increasing number of people to feed is in 
itself a cause for concern, but when it is 
compounded with the shifting trend in eating 
habits, the issue of feeding the world's population 
becomes a major challenge. The main reason is 
that as a rule of thumb, for example, around 7 
calories in the form of cereals are needed to yield 
1 calorie in the form of beef. The ratios are slightly 
more favourable for chicken and pork, but they do 
not change the picture radically. Therefore, while 
average per capita direct (human) consumption of 
cereals for the world as a whole remains roughly 
stable, demand for cereals as feed for livestock 
(indirect consumption) is increasing sharply. This is 
the main driving force behind the projected growth 
in aggregated per capita cereal consumption. 
Indirect per capita consumption of cereals is 
projected to increase by about 80 per cent 
worldwide in the next 20 years (estimates from the 
International Food Policy Research Institute, 1995), 
i.e. it is expected to rise from 38 kg per capita to 57 
kg. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, the regions 
with the highest rates of increase in their net cereal 
imports, are the two regions that face the greatest 
challenge in meeting food demand. Net imports in 
sub-Saharan Africa could be multiplied by as much 
as 4 and in South Asia by as much as 10 over the 
same period. Overall, it is generally agreed that 
world food supplies will have to more than double 
by 2025 to cover demand in terms of both quantity 
and quality. 
Economic issues 
The ability of developing countries to finance 
these rising cereal import costs depends on an 
increase in their export earnings or "import 
capacity", and on food aid. Export earnings are 
linked to general prospects of economic growth 
and trade liberalization in developed countries, 
their main export markets. The future of food aid 
depends on the availability of food surpluses in 
food-exporting developed countries, such as those 
of the European Union, and on their willingness — 
in the face of competing demands — to provide 
food aid under the rules of the Uruguay Round 
regime. Furthermore, we have to consider the 
© IPTS - JRC - Seville, 1999 
N o . 3 9 N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 9 T h e I P T S R e p o r t 
available global cargo capacities to see whether 
food distribution on the implied scale will be 
possible. According to Daimler Chrysler Aerospace 
AG (1998), air cargo capabilities will increase by a 
factor of 2.25 between now and 2015. 
In this context, the FAO has predicted a major 
change in the net trade position of the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. By 
2010, they are likely to become net exporters of 
cereals because of more efficient use of cereals as 
animal feed and of a reduction in the prevailing 
high level of post-harvest losses. As a 
consequence, they may be able to offset part of 
the increased demand from developing countries. 
A special mention needs to be made of China 
whose very size is such that its behaviour can 
drastically alter world supply and demand. 
Considering current capabilities, growth in 
production and net exports from developed 
countries are expected to be adequate to meet the 
rising import needs of developing countries over 
the next ten years. The annual growth rate of food 
production in developing countries is expected to 
range from 1.8 to 2 .1% against a rate of increase 
of 2.2-2.4% in domestic consumption (assuming 
the continuation of current yield growths and the 
regulatory system). If these trends hold, they will 
lead to an increase in needs for imports from 
about 90 million tonnes in 1989-91 to more than 
double this volume by 2010. After 2010, both the 
absolute volume of net imports and the ratio of 
imports to domestic production are projected to 
rise further in developing countries. 
An important aspect to take into account is the 
elasticity of land use with respect to food prices. If 
demand rises quickly and prices go up, marginal 
land may be cultivated to increase output, 
exerting a downward pressure on prices. This is a 
compensation mechanism which works well but 
with some delay because of crop rotation times. 
options for increasing agricultural output 
So far, agriculture has always been able to 
meet the global challenges of increasing food 
demand by increasing the cultivated surface area, 
breeding better crop varieties, using fertilizers and 
pesticides, improving agricultural know-how and 
developing irrigation. 
• Increasing the cultivated surface area: 
Today, the most fertile lands in the world are 
already under cultivation. As the population 
continues to increase, urban areas grow, new 
roads are built and factories are constructed. 
Very often, this occurs at the expense of 
productive agricultural lands (e.g. Paris, 
Bangkok and Shanghai). As a result, the 
potential for increasing the cultivated surface 
area worldwide is now limited. 
• Using fertilizers and pesticides: 
Agrochemicals have been the workhorse of the 
last major yield increases in agriculture. While 
they are already used to their full potential in 
industrialized countries and a number of 
developing countries, some gains can still be 
expected in the remaining areas. However, the 
long-term use of agrochemicals is beginning to 
show adverse environmental and health effects 
and the trend is towards curbing the reliance 
of agriculture on them. Again, potential 
productivity gains are therefore limited. 
• Improving agricultural know-how: 
Scientific research and technology transfer to 
farmers have enabled every farmer to feed more 
and more people over the last 50 years. This 
has resulted in a drastic decrease in the farming 
population in many areas of the world, mostly 
in industrialized countries. Spreading this 
know-how would undoubtedly bring significant 
increases in the agricultural productivity of the 
less favoured areas, but cultural and economic 
barriers make this very difficult. 
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Growth in production 
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developed countries 
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rising import needs of 
developing countries 
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So far, agriculture has 
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The prospects for 
biotechnology's 
providing a significant 
breakthrough in yield 
in the next 10-15 years 
are limited: its major 
near-term contribution 
will be to provide 
greater resistance to 
pests and diseases and 
enhanced stability by 
reducing periodic 
decline in yields 
The agrofoods industry 
in Europe is facing the 
dual challenge of 
Agenda 2000 reform, 
preparing the way for 
eastward expansion of 
the EU, and adaptation 
to WTO agreements 
• Developing irrigation: 
In many areas of the world (e.g. Spain, 
California), irrigation accounts for more than 
three quarters of total water consumption. In 
other areas (e.g. the Middle East), water 
resources are so scarce that little water is 
available for irrigation. Additionally, large tracts 
of land cannot be irrigated economically. This 
means that most of the improvements to be 
gained by irrigation depend mainly on 
improving irrigation technology. The area 
available for additional irrigation is estimated 
to be limited to 50 percent above the currently 
irrigated area, 80 percent of which is located in 
developing countries. Once again, the scope 
for increased productivity is therefore limited. 
• Breeding better crop varieties: 
Ever since agriculture appeared, man has 
applied selective pressures to obtain the desired 
crop varieties. Breeding techniques have played 
a major role over the last century to enable 
agriculture to respond to increasing demands. 
However, every additional improvement is more 
difficult and there is a question-mark as to 
whether the gains in productivity will be able to 
satisfy increasing expectations. 
In view of the challenges of the 21 s t century 
(see Box 1), current efforts may be inadequate. 
Biotechnology, a possible breakthrough? 
The five approaches described above have 
been able to provide huge improvements, but 
there is no longer any assurance of their being 
sufficient to feed the world in the 21st century. A 
new breakthrough is delivering fresh hopes: 
biotechnology. This new area includes the design 
and production of better plants and animals, using 
modern biological and genetic engineering 
methods particularly aimed at providing 
resistance to pests, improving nutrient and water 
use and developing interesting crop features such 
as improved nutritional characteristics. This 
promises to enlarge the scope for use of marginal 
lands, increase yields on the existing cultivated 
areas (where most of the effort is concentrated) 
and reduce the pesticide-related environmental 
burden of agriculture, enabling it to sustain an 
increased population. 
However, the prospects of biotechnology's 
providing a significant breakthrough in yield in 
the next 10-15 years are limited: its major near-
Box 1. issues to be addressed by the agriculture of the 2 1 s t century 
Increasing population and increasing urbanization 
Changes in consumption patterns 
Scarce water resources 
Price swings in food commodities 
Levelling off of agricultural productivity gains 
Decrease in available arable land 
Slowing down of crop yield improvements through conventional seed development 
Changing climate 
Pressure on biodiversity 
Increasingly global economy 
Risks of hunger-related conflicts 
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term contribution will be to provide greater 
resistance to pests and diseases and to enhanced 
stability by reducing periodic decline in yields. 
Moreover, thorough risk assessment may delay 
technology transfer to developing areas in need of 
higher food production. Note however, on the 
other hand, that such technology transfers may 
increase technology dependence for less 
developed countries. 
Biotechnology alone is not sufficient 
to achieve the required productivity impro­
vements. Integrated Pest Management (IPM), 
Integrated Crop Management (ICM) and 
finally, Plant Production Management (PPM) 
are the strategies necessary to achieve 
sustainable agriculture, and therefore sustai­
nable development. 
Optimized and integrated use of all available 
technologies must be implemented at farm level. 
Extreme positions, whether organic farming 
or intensive GMO farming may provide 
inappropriate solutions. An integrative approach 
viewing agriculture as an industrial ecosystem 
may be the best way to safeguard enough food for 
all in the future. 
Opportunities for European agriculture 
Agenda 2000, the European policy document 
preparing the way for the enlargement of the 
European Union, summarizes the challenges 
raised by future food demands: "According to 
the major forecasting institutes world-wide, the 
long term outlook for the main agricultural 
markets is favourable for exporting countries. 
Prospects for increased food consumption, 
mainly in developing countries, combined with 
the limited possibility of a proportional growth in 
domestic production, are expected to boost 
world trade and sustain world prices over the 
next decade." 
European agriculture is now undergoing a 
major policy-driven transition to adapt to 
agreements signed under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), to prepare for enlargement 
and to face increasing international competitive 
pressures. This restructuring must stimulate 
European farmers and policy makers to look 
ahead together and identify the opportunities for 
European agriculture in the 2 1 s t century. These 
opportunities may appear in the form of new 
markets for European products, smoother 
harmonization of European agriculture, a 
positive trade balance, excellence in logistic 
systems and increased cargo capacities. 
The time has come for a substantial discussion 
of European agriculture to define what 
agricultural model European society wants to 
adopt for the 2 1 s ' century - an agricultural model 
based on social, economic or ecological factors, 
or perhaps an integrative model defining different 
strategies for different European regions. 
Conclusions 
It is generally agreed that food related 
agricultural production worldwide will have to 
more than double by 2025 to meet demand, not 
only because of the increase in population but 
also because of a widespread shift in diets towards 
increased meat consumption. This is creating vast 
opportunities for those regions of the world able 
to produce in excess of their needs, such as the 
EU and the USA. It is also likely to increase the 
pressure to use biotechnology in agriculture. The 
policy decisions taken now are therefore crucial 
to enable European agriculture to seize these 
opportunities. The future model of European 
agriculture must fit into a broad European vision 
which can rally all the actors concerned for the 
long-term benefit of all. This includes long-term 
assessment of world food needs and strategies to 
address them. -Λ 
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Biotechnology R&D Policy: 
Bridging Commercial interests 
and Environmental, Distributive 
and Ethical Concerns 
Annegrethe Hansen, CISTEMA-DTU 
issue: in a number of European studies public acceptance has been cited as a key factor 
for the development of new biotechnologies such as genetic engineering. Governments 
and private companies who have recognized the importance of acceptance have 
Included information activities In their company strategy and public technology policy. 
However, the effect on public acceptance of providing more Information, creating 
greater understanding, or even establishing regulations is not always clear cut. 
Relevance: It seems to be a prerequisite for biotechnology development that 
governments, companies and European and International authorities Initiate debate on 
environmental and ethical concerns, and ensure that they are reflected in decisions on 
biotechnology R&P and technology development. Whilst public Inputs to R&D and 
technology strategy do not guarantee the acceptance of biotechnology In general, they 
can play a role In limiting the uncertainty related to R&D and development decisions. 
The backdrop to technology policy 
S ince the late 1970s and early 1980s, following the first successful and commercially viable gene transfer between two different organisms in 1973, new 
biotechnology1 development, including genetic 
engineering, has been the subject of R&D and 
technology policy in most industrialized 
countries, and the EU-countries are no exception. 
National and international policies have reflected 
an optimistic science-push conception of 
technological development and a view of 
biotechnology as an important international 
competitive factor for industry. Thus national 
public biotechnology R&D has been regarded by 
these countries as a potential means of boosting 
competitiveness. 
Since 1973 both the scientific and com-
mercial development of new biotechnology and 
national, European and international regulations 
governing it have been an issue high on the 
political agenda. Scientific breakthroughs have 
also stimulated public debate on the subject. 
Regulation has been concerned primarily with 
the environmental and health risks and, to 
a lesser extent, with other environmental, 
health and nutritional consequences. Although 
not specifically regulated, the ethical 
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The biotechnology 
industry tends to 
be understood 
on a science-push 
model of technology 
development and is 
seen by many 
countries as an 
important factor in 
competitiveness 
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The potential identified 
for biotechnology 
has meant that large 
government-backed 
R&D programmes 
have been set up in a 
number of countries. 
Meanwhile, the 
debate on the issues 
raised has at times 
become heated 
consequences of new biotechnology are also to 
some extent covered by other regulations. 
The debate is a complex one and has often cut 
across traditional groupings. In this article we will 
look at the way in which Danish biotechnology 
developed up until the mid 1990s. 
An example: biotechnology policy in 
Denmark 
As is clear from a large number of scientific, 
economic and policy reports, biotechnology 
development has been regarded as science-based 
and a text book example of "science" and 
"technology push", i.e. science and technology 
have been considered to drive forward economic 
developments in the field. This view has been an 
underlying factor in the public policy approach of 
a number of Western industrialized countries, 
including Denmark. The modest military interest 
in biotechnology, and the absence of direct public 
procurement, have been further arguments for 
public R&D investments to promote new 
biotechnology. In parallel with the R&D 
programmes, environmental regulation in 
Denmark has taken the form of a law on 
environmental and genetic engineering and a 
government order on working conditions. 
Debates on the risks and consequences of 
biotechnology have taken place in both the US 
and most European countries, although they have 
emphasized different aspects of the field in 
different countries. The debates have involved 
groups of various sizes and have varied in 
intensity, with demonstrations in Germany, the 
United Kingdom, the US and the Netherlands 
being some of the stronger manifestations. This 
atmosphere of protest has been seen by some 
industrialists and policy-makers as putting a brake 
on the growth of the sector, and greater 
information and promoting understanding was 
suggested as a way of countering perceived public 
scepticism. In Denmark, the Parliament therefore 
insisted that information and educational 
activities be included in the large biotechnology 
R&D programmes. 
The R&D programmes, regulations and the 
setting up of an Ethical Council were debated 
between 1986 and 1987, around the same time as 
the first two companies applied for permission to 
produce human growth hormones and insulin. 
More recently this part of the debate has come 
to the fore in Denmark and elsewhere as 
genetically engineered crops and food have 
become a reality. The focus of public concern has 
therefore shifted over the course of the 1990s, 
reflecting new developments in biotechnology. 
R&D results from released plants and more 
extensive diagnostic potentials2 have raised new 
issues for discussion and questions on regulation. 
When the EU regulation was introduced in 1991 
only a small part of the public participated in the 
discussions. Furthermore, the discussions did not 
pay much attention to the regional disparities 
regarding the consequences of applying new 
biotechnology and differing agendas for the 
debate3. 
An example: Danish biotechnology R&D 
programmes and regulation 
In 1987 the Danish Parliament agreed on a 
concerted action in the form of a large-scale 
biotechnology R&D programme. The first 
programme was followed by further government 
programmes, covering the periods 1987-90, 
1991-95 and 1995-99. 
In addition to the original programme 
proposal, information activities and technology 
assessment activities were included. This was a 
consequence of a relatively widespread 
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recognition in Parliament that public 
understanding and acceptance were prerequisites 
for development. Different interest groups 
participated in a public enquiry and also the 
public debates contributed to Parliament's 
recognition of the scepticism regarding 
biotechnology's social and ethical consequences. 
The Danish biotechnology-related environ-
mental regulation and regulation of working 
conditions were initiated simultaneously with the 
first applications for permits to incorporate 
genetic engineering into production techniques or 
R&D programmes. 
The discussions on regulation largely mirrored 
events in the US. By the 1980s the ethical 
dimension of the debate was less prominent than 
in the 1970s4, the focus having shifted to 
environmental risks and consequences. The 
discussions in Denmark also followed those 
taking place on regulations at European level, but 
Denmark introduced its own regulation in 1986, 
which was then revised in 1991 to comply with 
EU directives. The Law of 1986 envisaged a 
voluntary registration procedure, which both the 
registration committee and a number of different 
interest groups found to be inadequate because of 
more widespread use of new biotechnology and 
because of the fact that some commercially 
interesting research and applications were not 
being registered under the voluntary scheme 
(Statens Jordbrugs, 1982). 
Much of the debate seems to have 
concentrated on regulation and control, with the 
suggested regulations being focused primarily on 
environmental safety. Perhaps because of the 
presence of the legal profession (at least on the 
ethical council) discussions have focussed on 
proposing regulation for activities already being 
carried out or on the point of being carried out. 
The prioritizing of control has brought with it a 
focus on the possibility of measuring the suffering 
of animals by means of technology and natural 
science-based methods. Regulation of other 
concerns has been left without a forum. Although 
the industry argues that the ethical and 
distributive concerns are not specific to new 
biotechnology, a number of the debates regarded 
as essential by diverse interests and individuals 
have not been included in any framework, either 
for discussion or regulation. 
The debates and their consequences for 
public perception and acceptance 
The notion underlying the public's view of 
biotechnology is a rather deterministic perception 
of technology development as something either 
positive or negative. A positive perception of new 
biotechnology is accordingly regarded as 
essential for its competitive development. This 
was formulated, for example, in Eurobarometer 
46.1 (Commission of the European Communities, 
1997): "These changes will bring about many new 
opportunities, but they will also require that we 
learn, understand and adapt to the new paradigms 
they present. For this reason, information, 
education and a broad discussion of the issues 
by society must accompany biotechnology's 
development. " 
The notion of public perception can thus be 
criticized on two grounds: Firstly for disguising 
the conflicting interests inherent in a deterministic 
trajectory; and secondly, for presenting a picture 
of a technology as following a predetermined 
trajectory indifferent to both scientific, social, 
public and political influence. 
The debate both before and after the setting up 
of the regulatory regime, in the Danish example 
above, has revealed conflicts in the assumed 
trajectory. Despite this, the regulation of both 
environmental and ethical consequences has to a 
s. 35 
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Discussions on 
regulating 
biotechnology 
mainly focused on 
environmental issues, 
tending not to 
address ethical and 
distributive issues 
The debate has tended 
to assume that the 
technology will follow 
a fixed trajectory, 
which must be either 
approved or not, 
rather than the idea 
that this trajectory can 
itself be modified 
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Regulation was sought 
by industry in order to 
create a stable 
framework in which 
firms could operate. 
However, it has not 
ensured universal 
public acceptance of 
the technology 
large extent been regarded as an isolated reaction 
towards a defined trajectory with predictable 
consequences. Altering or relaxing the existing 
regulation of environmental risks and working 
conditions were predicted only if risks in the 
adopted regulation turned out to be 
overestimated. 
It was, however, not considered that more 
radical change in the regulation or new 
biotechnology strategy could be a possible 
response to unanticipated or undesirable 
developments in biotechnology. These unwanted 
developments or consequences might be both 
health and environmental risks and more far-
reaching environmental consequences, as well as 
structural, distributive5 and social consequences. 
This regulation appeared not to ensure 
acceptance. This could be interpreted either as 
distrust of the regulation and its scope or a failure 
to address the variety of concerns expressed. In the 
Danish case, several large companies (particularly 
pharmaceuticals companies) have claimed that 
early and strict regulation of genetic engineering 
benefited competitive advantage in biotechnology 
by securing acceptance and a stable regulatory 
regime early on. However, neither in the food and 
beverage industry, nor in the agricultural sector, 
has regulation led to public acceptance of the use 
of new biotechnology. Uncertain or unwanted 
negative consequences rather than public 
perception seem to have limited acceptance and 
consequently potential application. 
The influence of the debates that preceded the 
approval of the large R&D programmes into new 
biotechnology was exemplary in acknowledging 
diverse interests in new biotechnology, and in 
reflecting them in the programme. The actual 
grant system, however, hampered a more 
pluralistic influence on the rate and direction of 
new biotechnology research. 
The impression given by a number of 
indicators is that the effect of debates can be 
ambiguous and that increasing knowledge and 
information can lead to a more varied attitude 
to new biotechnology, but not to general 
acceptance. Information gives the public insights 
not only into the technological developments and 
their applications, but also into the commercial 
interests behind them, and into their structural 
conditions and implications. Insight into the role 
of large firms and the possible strengthening of 
their economic and political power through the 
development of new biotechnology may 
contribute to scepticism. 
The European dimension 
The Eurobarometer surveys (Commission of 
the European Communities, 1993 and 1997) and 
national surveys, such as for example the Dutch 
SWOKA (Hamstra, 1993) and the Danish 
Teknologinævnet (Borre, 1991) indicate similar 
findings of an increased degree of reflection and 
more nuanced attitudes towards biotechnology as 
a result of increased knowledge and information. 
That is, more information and more knowledge 
cannot be said in general to increase acceptance. 
In Eurobarometer, 1996 (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1997) objective 
knowledge is found to have increased in the 15 
European Union countries. At the same time the 
surveys (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1993 and 1997) indicate that 
despite increasing knowledge about new 
biotechnology, optimism with regard to the 
benefits in general and within certain areas of new 
biotechnology has decreased. This finding applies 
to a number of countries in both northern 
and southern Europe. That is, also within 
technological areas which have been and are still 
viewed fairly positively by the public, optimism 
has decreased despite a general increase in the 
level of knowledge. 
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It should be obvious that the opposite 
conclusion with respect to information and 
regulation cannot be drawn: Lack of information 
and lack of regulation will certainly not lead to 
acceptance. The claim advanced here is that 
"public perception" cannot be applied as a 
general condition for further development of new 
biotechnology. There are conflicting interests that 
need to be addressed. Regulation needs to guide 
private and public biotechnology in socially and 
politically acceptable directions. Access needs to 
be given for alternative interests to define research 
and development paths and ensure variety - at the 
industrial as well as at the science and technology 
policy level. 
Increased knowledge, wherever it comes from, 
will entail increasing perception of the risks as 
well as the benefits, and so may strengthen 
scepticism and criticism as well as support. 
However, neither benefits nor other consequences 
are unambiguous for any of the stakeholder 
groups. Involving environmental, distributive, 
economic, social or ethical reasoning might 
mean it is necessary for new biotechnology 
development to move at a different pace or in a 
different direction. However, this gives no 
guarantee of general acceptance: The potential 
social and technological outcomes move in 
parallel with increasing knowledge and changing 
perceptions, thus botri the technology, and the 
environment which shapes it, evolve. 
Instead of regarding questions, criticism and 
demands as barriers to development, it is some­
times suggested that policy-makers and industry 
should view these dimensions as contributions to 
reducing uncertainty in the selection of biotech­
nology activities to be included in policy-making 
and strategy formation. The initiatives may include 
regulation, but more importantly they may change 
the rate and direction of technology development, 
and in particular that of biotechnology. 
Conclusion 
The example of the development of Danish 
biotechnology policy described here suggests 
R&D policy is able to make a potential 
contribution to reducing uncertainty and also to 
making technology development a more 
democratic process. It also suggests that 
regulation and public discussions of controversies 
potentially reduce uncertainty for industry. At the 
same time the account also demonstrates that 
regulation and public discussion are necessary 
but not sufficient conditions for public acceptance 
and that political intentions are not necessarily 
enough to ensure democratic technology 
development. 
In Europe, in general, the debates on new 
biotechnology development have addressed a 
variety of factors: environmental risks and 
consequences and their distribution; distribution 
of the economic and other benefits and costs 
between companies and consumers, and between 
countries; structural consequences and ethical 
concerns. Predictions and controversies over 
conditions and consequences of biotechnology 
development make the debate more than a 
question of acceptance with a few modifications. 
Technology analyses, technology assessments 
and information activities contribute to the 
debates and to actual R&D policy and regulation. 
To some extent they may be regarded as isolated 
activities rather than part of a continuous process. 
The account above suggests, however, that both 
the conditions assumed and the scientific 
developments are changing, and so assumptions 
about outcomes must be modified accordingly. It 
is therefore suggested that democratic debate and 
better informed policy decisions should be based 
on continuous technology analyses and 
technology assessments - with public access to 
information and knowledge as prerequisites for 
these analyses, assessments and debate. Jm 
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Although information 
does not guarantee 
acceptance, clearly lack 
of information and lack 
of regulation will 
certainly not lead to it. 
Conflicting interests 
need to be addressed 
and regulations need 
to help guide the 
technology in socially 
acceptable directions 
Involving 
environmental, 
distributive, economic, 
social or ethical 
issues might mean 
biotechnology 
development moves 
at a different pace 
or in a different 
direction 
IPTS - JRC - Seville, 1999 
T h e I P T S R e p o r t N o . 3 9 N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 9 
38 
/ 
ƒ 
About the author 
Annegrethe Hansen has 
an M.Sc. in economics and 
business administration 
f rom the Copenhagen 
Business School, and a 
Ph.d from the Danish 
Technical University. She 
is an assistant researcher 
at the Department of 
Technology and Social 
Sciences at the Danish 
Technical University 
where she is working on 
technology assessment 
of new biotechnology 
and economic and 
socio-economic theories 
on technological change. 
She has taught at the 
Danish Technical University 
and at the Copenhagen 
Business School. 
Keywords 
biotechnology, technology policy, public political influence, technology assessment 
Notes 
1 - The distinction between classical, modern and new biotechnology has been used among others by 
the OECD (OECD, 1989). The box below is inspired by the OECD's classification. 
Classical biotechnology 
Technologies that have been used for thousand of years for the production of beer, cheese, wine, 
bread etc. mainly on the basis of experience. 
Modem biotechnology 
The more science based development of the classical biotechnologies, a development which 
started in the 19th century. 
New biotechnology 
The technologies which developed since the late 1970s including genetic engineering and cell fusion. 
2- Though the possibility of gene transfer between released plants and other species was discussed in 
the preparation of the Danish regulation, it was the actual releases and research documenting the 
transfers that brought the question of regulation into focus. Also the potential of extensive new 
diagnostics and treatments had been foreseen in the 1970s, but the actual appearance of the techniques 
made the discussions of their regulation more pressing. 
3- Regarding the release of organisms into the environment, the risk of transfer of genes from specific 
modified plants to other plants might vary with the flora of the country. Regarding the differences in 
public discussions, the "problem" that genetic engineering is meant to solve in specific contexts, might 
be more severe in some countries than others, and people thus more willing to taker greater risks. 
4- The discussions of ethics included both the researchers' ethics amidst scientific and commercial 
interests in an area with potentially large commercial benefits, and the ethical concerns regarding a 
technology that could transgress biological barriers. 
5- The concentration in large (multinational) companies of seed production, for instance, and farmers' 
dependence on seed and pesticide packages are examples of the distributive consequences mentioned 
- these issues were raised early on by, among others, the environmental group NOAH and development 
researchers (see for example NOAH, 1988), and the debate continues with the latest EU marketing 
approvals (see for example Danish press debates, winter 1998). 
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A B O U T T H E I P T S 
The IPTS is one of the eight institutes of the Joint Research Centre of the EU Commission. Its remit 
is the observation and follow-up of technological change in its broadest sense, in order to 
understand better its links with economic and social change. The Institute carries out and co-
ordinates research to improve our understanding of the impact of new technologies, and their 
relationship to their socio-economic context. 
The purpose of this work is to support the decision-maker in the management of change pivotally 
anchored on S/T developments. In this endeavour IPTS enjoys a dual advantage: being a part of the 
Commission IPTS shares EU goals and priorities; on the other hand it cherishes its research institute 
neutrality and distance from the intricacies of actual policy-making. This combination allows the 
IPTS to build bridges betwen EU undertakings, contributing to and co-ordinating the creation of 
common knowledge bases at the disposal of all stake-holders. Though the work of the IPTS is 
mainly addressed to the Commission, it also works with decision-makers in the European 
Parliament, and agencies and institutions in the Member States. 
The Institute's main activities, defined in close cooperation with the decision-maker are: 
1. Technology Watch. This activity aims to alert European decision-makers to the social, economic 
and political consequences of major technological issues and trends. This is achieved through the 
European Science and Technology Observatory (ESTO), a European-wide network of nationally 
based organisations. The IPTS is the central node of ESTO, co-ordinating technology watch 'joint 
ventures' with the aim of better understanding technological change. 
2. Technology, employment & competitiveness. Given the significance of these issues for Europe 
and the EU institutions, the technology-employment-competitiveness relationship is the driving 
force behind all IPTS activities, focusing analysis on the potential of promising technologies for job 
creation, economic growth and social welfare. Such analyses may be linked to specific 
technologies, technological sectors, or cross-sectoral issues and themes. 
3. Support for policy-making. The IPTS also undertakes work to supports both Commission services 
and other EU institutions in response to specific requests, usually as a direct contribution to 
decision-making and/or policy implementation. These tasks are fully integrated with, and take full 
advantage of on-going Technology Watch activities. 
As well as collaborating directly with policy-makers in order to obtain first-hand understanding of 
their concerns, the IPTS draws upon sector actors' knowledge and promotes dialogue between 
them, whilst working in close co-operation with the scientific community so as to ensure technical 
accuracy. In addition to its flagship IPTS Report, the work of the IPTS is also presented in occasional 
prospective notes, a series of dossiers, synthesis reports and working papers. 
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